diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp | 178 |
1 files changed, 137 insertions, 41 deletions
diff --git a/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp b/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp index 4928bb528..f1a666814 100644 --- a/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp +++ b/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp @@ -692,26 +692,142 @@ namespace cryptonote return false; } + // resolve outPk references in rct txes + // outPk aren't the only thing that need resolving for a fully resolved tx, + // but outPk (1) are needed now to check range proof semantics, and + // (2) do not need access to the blockchain to find data + if (tx.version >= 2) + { + rct::rctSig &rv = tx.rct_signatures; + if (rv.outPk.size() != tx.vout.size()) + { + LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Bad outPk size in tx " << tx_hash << ", rejected"); + tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true; + return false; + } + for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.rct_signatures.outPk.size(); ++n) + rv.outPk[n].dest = rct::pk2rct(boost::get<txout_to_key>(tx.vout[n].target).key); + + const bool bulletproof = rct::is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type); + if (bulletproof) + { + if (rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs) != tx.vout.size()) + { + LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Bad bulletproofs size in tx " << tx_hash << ", rejected"); + tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true; + return false; + } + size_t idx = 0; + for (size_t n = 0; n < rv.p.bulletproofs.size(); ++n) + { + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.bulletproofs[n].L.size() >= 6, false, "Bad bulletproofs L size"); // at least 64 bits + const size_t n_amounts = rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs[n]); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(idx + n_amounts <= rv.outPk.size(), false, "Internal error filling out V"); + rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.clear(); + for (size_t i = 0; i < n_amounts; ++i) + rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.push_back(rv.outPk[idx++].mask); + } + } + } + return true; + } + //----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + void core::set_semantics_failed(const crypto::hash &tx_hash) + { + LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Failed to check tx " << tx_hash << " semantic, rejected"); + bad_semantics_txes_lock.lock(); + bad_semantics_txes[0].insert(tx_hash); + if (bad_semantics_txes[0].size() >= BAD_SEMANTICS_TXES_MAX_SIZE) + { + std::swap(bad_semantics_txes[0], bad_semantics_txes[1]); + bad_semantics_txes[0].clear(); + } + bad_semantics_txes_lock.unlock(); + } + //----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + bool core::handle_incoming_tx_accumulated_batch(std::vector<tx_verification_batch_info> &tx_info, bool keeped_by_block) + { + bool ret = true; if (keeped_by_block && get_blockchain_storage().is_within_compiled_block_hash_area()) { MTRACE("Skipping semantics check for tx kept by block in embedded hash area"); + return true; } - else if(!check_tx_semantic(tx, keeped_by_block)) + + std::vector<const rct::rctSig*> rvv; + for (size_t n = 0; n < tx_info.size(); ++n) { - LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Failed to check tx " << tx_hash << " semantic, rejected"); - tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true; - bad_semantics_txes_lock.lock(); - bad_semantics_txes[0].insert(tx_hash); - if (bad_semantics_txes[0].size() >= BAD_SEMANTICS_TXES_MAX_SIZE) + if (!check_tx_semantic(*tx_info[n].tx, keeped_by_block)) { - std::swap(bad_semantics_txes[0], bad_semantics_txes[1]); - bad_semantics_txes[0].clear(); + set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash); + tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true; + tx_info[n].result = false; + continue; + } + + if (tx_info[n].tx->version < 2) + continue; + const rct::rctSig &rv = tx_info[n].tx->rct_signatures; + switch (rv.type) { + case rct::RCTTypeNull: + // coinbase should not come here, so we reject for all other types + MERROR_VER("Unexpected Null rctSig type"); + set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash); + tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true; + tx_info[n].result = false; + break; + case rct::RCTTypeSimple: + if (!rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(rv)) + { + MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed"); + set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash); + tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true; + tx_info[n].result = false; + break; + } + break; + case rct::RCTTypeFull: + if (!rct::verRct(rv, true)) + { + MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed"); + set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash); + tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true; + tx_info[n].result = false; + break; + } + break; + case rct::RCTTypeBulletproof: + rvv.push_back(&rv); // delayed batch verification + break; + default: + MERROR_VER("Unknown rct type: " << rv.type); + set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash); + tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true; + tx_info[n].result = false; + break; + } + } + if (!rvv.empty() && !rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(rvv)) + { + LOG_PRINT_L1("One transaction among this group has bad semantics, verifying one at a time"); + ret = false; + const bool assumed_bad = rvv.size() == 1; // if there's only one tx, it must be the bad one + for (size_t n = 0; n < tx_info.size(); ++n) + { + if (!tx_info[n].result) + continue; + if (tx_info[n].tx->rct_signatures.type != rct::RCTTypeBulletproof) + continue; + if (assumed_bad || !rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(tx_info[n].tx->rct_signatures)) + { + set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash); + tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true; + tx_info[n].result = false; + } } - bad_semantics_txes_lock.unlock(); - return false; } - return true; + return ret; } //----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- bool core::handle_incoming_txs(const std::vector<blobdata>& tx_blobs, std::vector<tx_verification_context>& tvc, bool keeped_by_block, bool relayed, bool do_not_relay) @@ -769,6 +885,16 @@ namespace cryptonote } waiter.wait(&tpool); + std::vector<tx_verification_batch_info> tx_info; + tx_info.reserve(tx_blobs.size()); + for (size_t i = 0; i < tx_blobs.size(); i++) { + if (!results[i].res) + continue; + tx_info.push_back({&results[i].tx, results[i].hash, tvc[i], results[i].res}); + } + if (!tx_info.empty()) + handle_incoming_tx_accumulated_batch(tx_info, keeped_by_block); + bool ok = true; it = tx_blobs.begin(); for (size_t i = 0; i < tx_blobs.size(); i++, ++it) { @@ -886,36 +1012,6 @@ namespace cryptonote return false; } - if (tx.version >= 2) - { - const rct::rctSig &rv = tx.rct_signatures; - switch (rv.type) { - case rct::RCTTypeNull: - // coinbase should not come here, so we reject for all other types - MERROR_VER("Unexpected Null rctSig type"); - return false; - case rct::RCTTypeSimple: - case rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof: - if (!rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(rv)) - { - MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed"); - return false; - } - break; - case rct::RCTTypeFull: - case rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof: - if (!rct::verRct(rv, true)) - { - MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed"); - return false; - } - break; - default: - MERROR_VER("Unknown rct type: " << rv.type); - return false; - } - } - return true; } //----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
