aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authormoneromooo-monero <moneromooo-monero@users.noreply.github.com>2018-03-30 20:29:42 +0100
committermoneromooo-monero <moneromooo-monero@users.noreply.github.com>2018-09-11 13:37:37 +0000
commit2a8fcb421bc41eb254f95379dd73238915dd509d (patch)
tree5c8d4b888a12459c60b94d6d6e8ff9cae5f7a421 /src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp
parent126196b017cd93ff399212b7315f9053511afb07 (diff)
downloadmonzero-core-2a8fcb421bc41eb254f95379dd73238915dd509d.tar.gz
monzero-core-2a8fcb421bc41eb254f95379dd73238915dd509d.tar.xz
monzero-core-2a8fcb421bc41eb254f95379dd73238915dd509d.zip
Bulletproof aggregated verification and tests
Also constrains bulletproofs to simple rct, for simplicity
Diffstat (limited to 'src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp')
-rw-r--r--src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp178
1 files changed, 137 insertions, 41 deletions
diff --git a/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp b/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp
index 4928bb528..f1a666814 100644
--- a/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp
+++ b/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp
@@ -692,26 +692,142 @@ namespace cryptonote
return false;
}
+ // resolve outPk references in rct txes
+ // outPk aren't the only thing that need resolving for a fully resolved tx,
+ // but outPk (1) are needed now to check range proof semantics, and
+ // (2) do not need access to the blockchain to find data
+ if (tx.version >= 2)
+ {
+ rct::rctSig &rv = tx.rct_signatures;
+ if (rv.outPk.size() != tx.vout.size())
+ {
+ LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Bad outPk size in tx " << tx_hash << ", rejected");
+ tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
+ return false;
+ }
+ for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.rct_signatures.outPk.size(); ++n)
+ rv.outPk[n].dest = rct::pk2rct(boost::get<txout_to_key>(tx.vout[n].target).key);
+
+ const bool bulletproof = rct::is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
+ if (bulletproof)
+ {
+ if (rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs) != tx.vout.size())
+ {
+ LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Bad bulletproofs size in tx " << tx_hash << ", rejected");
+ tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
+ return false;
+ }
+ size_t idx = 0;
+ for (size_t n = 0; n < rv.p.bulletproofs.size(); ++n)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.bulletproofs[n].L.size() >= 6, false, "Bad bulletproofs L size"); // at least 64 bits
+ const size_t n_amounts = rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs[n]);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(idx + n_amounts <= rv.outPk.size(), false, "Internal error filling out V");
+ rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.clear();
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < n_amounts; ++i)
+ rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.push_back(rv.outPk[idx++].mask);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return true;
+ }
+ //-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ void core::set_semantics_failed(const crypto::hash &tx_hash)
+ {
+ LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Failed to check tx " << tx_hash << " semantic, rejected");
+ bad_semantics_txes_lock.lock();
+ bad_semantics_txes[0].insert(tx_hash);
+ if (bad_semantics_txes[0].size() >= BAD_SEMANTICS_TXES_MAX_SIZE)
+ {
+ std::swap(bad_semantics_txes[0], bad_semantics_txes[1]);
+ bad_semantics_txes[0].clear();
+ }
+ bad_semantics_txes_lock.unlock();
+ }
+ //-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ bool core::handle_incoming_tx_accumulated_batch(std::vector<tx_verification_batch_info> &tx_info, bool keeped_by_block)
+ {
+ bool ret = true;
if (keeped_by_block && get_blockchain_storage().is_within_compiled_block_hash_area())
{
MTRACE("Skipping semantics check for tx kept by block in embedded hash area");
+ return true;
}
- else if(!check_tx_semantic(tx, keeped_by_block))
+
+ std::vector<const rct::rctSig*> rvv;
+ for (size_t n = 0; n < tx_info.size(); ++n)
{
- LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Failed to check tx " << tx_hash << " semantic, rejected");
- tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
- bad_semantics_txes_lock.lock();
- bad_semantics_txes[0].insert(tx_hash);
- if (bad_semantics_txes[0].size() >= BAD_SEMANTICS_TXES_MAX_SIZE)
+ if (!check_tx_semantic(*tx_info[n].tx, keeped_by_block))
{
- std::swap(bad_semantics_txes[0], bad_semantics_txes[1]);
- bad_semantics_txes[0].clear();
+ set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
+ tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
+ tx_info[n].result = false;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (tx_info[n].tx->version < 2)
+ continue;
+ const rct::rctSig &rv = tx_info[n].tx->rct_signatures;
+ switch (rv.type) {
+ case rct::RCTTypeNull:
+ // coinbase should not come here, so we reject for all other types
+ MERROR_VER("Unexpected Null rctSig type");
+ set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
+ tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
+ tx_info[n].result = false;
+ break;
+ case rct::RCTTypeSimple:
+ if (!rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(rv))
+ {
+ MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed");
+ set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
+ tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
+ tx_info[n].result = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case rct::RCTTypeFull:
+ if (!rct::verRct(rv, true))
+ {
+ MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed");
+ set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
+ tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
+ tx_info[n].result = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case rct::RCTTypeBulletproof:
+ rvv.push_back(&rv); // delayed batch verification
+ break;
+ default:
+ MERROR_VER("Unknown rct type: " << rv.type);
+ set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
+ tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
+ tx_info[n].result = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!rvv.empty() && !rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(rvv))
+ {
+ LOG_PRINT_L1("One transaction among this group has bad semantics, verifying one at a time");
+ ret = false;
+ const bool assumed_bad = rvv.size() == 1; // if there's only one tx, it must be the bad one
+ for (size_t n = 0; n < tx_info.size(); ++n)
+ {
+ if (!tx_info[n].result)
+ continue;
+ if (tx_info[n].tx->rct_signatures.type != rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
+ continue;
+ if (assumed_bad || !rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(tx_info[n].tx->rct_signatures))
+ {
+ set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
+ tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
+ tx_info[n].result = false;
+ }
}
- bad_semantics_txes_lock.unlock();
- return false;
}
- return true;
+ return ret;
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool core::handle_incoming_txs(const std::vector<blobdata>& tx_blobs, std::vector<tx_verification_context>& tvc, bool keeped_by_block, bool relayed, bool do_not_relay)
@@ -769,6 +885,16 @@ namespace cryptonote
}
waiter.wait(&tpool);
+ std::vector<tx_verification_batch_info> tx_info;
+ tx_info.reserve(tx_blobs.size());
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < tx_blobs.size(); i++) {
+ if (!results[i].res)
+ continue;
+ tx_info.push_back({&results[i].tx, results[i].hash, tvc[i], results[i].res});
+ }
+ if (!tx_info.empty())
+ handle_incoming_tx_accumulated_batch(tx_info, keeped_by_block);
+
bool ok = true;
it = tx_blobs.begin();
for (size_t i = 0; i < tx_blobs.size(); i++, ++it) {
@@ -886,36 +1012,6 @@ namespace cryptonote
return false;
}
- if (tx.version >= 2)
- {
- const rct::rctSig &rv = tx.rct_signatures;
- switch (rv.type) {
- case rct::RCTTypeNull:
- // coinbase should not come here, so we reject for all other types
- MERROR_VER("Unexpected Null rctSig type");
- return false;
- case rct::RCTTypeSimple:
- case rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof:
- if (!rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(rv))
- {
- MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed");
- return false;
- }
- break;
- case rct::RCTTypeFull:
- case rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof:
- if (!rct::verRct(rv, true))
- {
- MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed");
- return false;
- }
- break;
- default:
- MERROR_VER("Unknown rct type: " << rv.type);
- return false;
- }
- }
-
return true;
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------