zmq: apply restricted-mode privacy filtering to get_transaction_pool

Add an include_sensitive parameter to tx_memory_pool::get_pool_for_rpc
(and its core passthrough), mirroring the include_sensitive_data
parameter on the HTTP analog get_transactions_and_spent_keys_info.
When false, receive_time and last_relayed_time are zeroed using the
same masking already applied on the HTTP path.

The ZMQ handler in daemon_handler.cpp passes !m_restricted, so
--restricted-zmq-rpc callers now receive the same privacy-filtered view
as restricted HTTP callers instead of the unfiltered timing metadata
they previously got. Stem-phase txs continue to be excluded regardless
(relay_category::broadcasted filter unchanged).

Refs #10529.

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/tests/core_tests/tx_pool.cpp b/tests/core_tests/tx_pool.cpp
index fab40a972..9ec89a936 100644
--- a/tests/core_tests/tx_pool.cpp
+++ b/tests/core_tests/tx_pool.cpp
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ bool txpool_double_spend_base::check_changed(cryptonote::core& c, const size_t e
   {
     std::vector<cryptonote::rpc::tx_in_pool> infos{};
     cryptonote::rpc::key_images_with_tx_hashes key_images{};
-    if (!c.get_pool_for_rpc(infos, key_images) || infos.size() != m_broadcasted_hashes.size() || key_images.size() != m_broadcasted_hashes.size())
+    if (!c.get_pool_for_rpc(infos, key_images, true) || infos.size() != m_broadcasted_hashes.size() || key_images.size() != m_broadcasted_hashes.size())
     {
       MERROR("Expected broadcasted rpc data to return " << m_broadcasted_hashes.size() << " but got " << infos.size() << " infos and " << key_images.size() << "key images");
       return false;